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I Introduction 
In its Final Report released in March 2015, the Competition Policy Review Committee 
(Harper Review Committee) made some radical recommendations for the reform of 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA), and none more so than Recommendation 
30. Recommendation 30 is that s 46(1) should be amended to prohibit a corporation that has a 
substantial degree of market power from engaging in conduct that has the purpose, effect or 
likely effect of substantially lessening competition. 
1
  
Prior to the Federal election on 2 July 2016, the Turnbull Government announced that if 
returned to power, it would legislate to give effect to Recommendation 30. In its Media 
Release the Government said that s 46 in its current form was: 
 … not reliably enforceable and permits anti-competitive conduct. This slows the entry and expansion 
of new and innovative firms, delays the entry of new technologies into Australia and impedes 
economic growth in the long run.
2
   
It is claimed that these amendments will make it easier for the ACCC or a private party to 
challenge unilateral anti-competitive conduct.
3
 It also stated that the incorporation of an 
effects test in s 46 was ‘…one of the many actions the Government is taking to protect small 
businesses’. Whether the adoption of an effects test in s 46 will be easier to satisfy than the 
current test, and whether it will provide additional protection for small businesses, are two 
claims that I will return to at the conclusion of my paper. 
By way of background and context, I will consider the following questions: 
                                                          
 
*Professor of Law, Queensland University of Technology. 
1 Final Report of the Competition Policy Review Committee, March 2015, at 348. Available at: http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/final-
report/  
2 The Hon Scott Morrison, “Fixing competition policy to drive economic growth and jobs” Media Release, 16 March 2016 available at 
http://sjm.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/030-2016/?utm_source=wysija&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Media+Release+-
+Fixing+competition+policy+to+drive+economic+growth+and+jobs. 
3
 R Sims, “A new section 46 will boost competition – not kill it” Australian Financial Review (22 March 2016), 47. 
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 What are the proposed amendments to s 46? 
 How has the effects test been applied in the context of ss 45, 47 and 50 of the CCA?  
 What role does economic efficiency play in applying the effects test? 
 How has the effects test been applied in the European Union? 
 In what circumstances will authorisation be available for s 46 conduct?  
II What are the proposed amendments to s 46? 
There is a degree of speculation involved as to the precise wording that will be adopted to 
incorporate an effects test in s 46. In its Media Release the Government stated that while it 
will consult on the Exposure Draft legislation before introducing it to Parliament later this 
year, it proposes to implement the Recommendation 30 in full. The Harper Review 
Committee set out its preferred wording of the new s 46 prohibition in Appendix A of its 
Report. Under the proposed wording s 46(1) will provide: 
A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market shall not engage in conduct if the 
conduct has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition in that or any other market. 
How does this wording differ from the existing prohibition? The first change to note is that 
the ‘taking advantage element’ in the existing s 46(1) prohibition has been deleted. The 
‘taking advantage’ element requires the Court to consider whether the conduct at issue is 
conduct that only a corporation with market power could have undertaken. In other words, there must 
be a connection or causal link between the impugned conduct and the respondent’s market power, in 
the sense that the respondent can only engage in that conduct because it possesses substantial market 
power. The need for this causal link will no longer apply under the new s 46. 
The second change to note is the removal of the mandatory subjective anti-competitive 
purpose element from the existing s 46(1). Under the existing s 46(1) it is necessary to 
consider the subjective purpose of the officers and employees of the corporation responsible 
for the impugned conduct. ‘Purpose’ in this context means: ‘the effect which it is sought to 
achieve – the end in view’.4 While the courts have been prepared to infer such a purpose from 
documentary evidence, proof of this element has proven difficult in the past, especially in the 
face of evidence given by witnesses in Court.
5
 Under the new s 46(1) a subjective anti-
competitive purpose is only one of three possible tests. In the absence of evidence of purpose, 
it will be possible to satisfy the prohibition by proving that the effect or likely effect of the 
conduct is a substantial lessening of competition. 
The third change to note is contained in the proposed s 46(2) which states that: 
in determining whether conduct has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening competition in a market, the court must have regard to the extent to which the 
conduct has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect of increasing competition in the 
market including by enhancing efficiency … (emphasis added).  
                                                          
4
 General Newspapers Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation (1993) 45 FCR 164 at 187 (Davies and Einfeld JJ). 
5
 See, e.g. ACCC v Pfizer Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 113 (Flick J). 
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Importantly, the direction will make clear that any enhancement of economic efficiency is 
only relevant to the extent that it leads to an increase in competition. 
The fourth change to note is making authorisation available for conduct that would otherwise 
infringe s 46.
6
 Authorisation is not currently available for conduct that might contravene s 
46(1). 
III Market Structure and the Effects Test 
With these speculative questions about the precise wording of the amendments in mind, let us 
look back and consider how the effects test has evolved over the past 40 years. What do we 
know already about the effects test from how it has been applied in the context of the other 
provisions of the CCA? How much clarity has emerged from the past 40 years’ jurisprudence 
surrounding the effects test?
7
  
A Re QCMA 
Chronologically, the starting point is the seminal determination of the Tribunal in 1975, Re 
Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd and Defiance Holdings (Re QCMA). 
Somewhat surprisingly, the fundamental concept of ‘competition’ for the purposes of the Act 
is not defined. In QCMA, the Tribunal adopted the economic concept of ‘workable 
competition’ as the concept of competition which the Act seeks to promote. The Tribunal 
stated: ‘Competition expresses itself as rivalrous market behaviour’.8 Rivalry is a nebulous 
concept. It is difficult to measure directly. Whether firms engage in rivalry depends largely 
on the structure of markets. ‘Market structure’ refers to ‘…those conditions external to the 
firm which are relatively permanent or which change only slowly, and which affect, if they 
do not determine, the way the firm operates’.9 
In Re QCMA the Tribunal adopted a structural analysis to determine the competitive impact 
of the impugned conduct. This approach requires first that the relevant market be defined; 
then the existing structural features of the market are identified; and finally the future effect 
of the impugned conduct on the structure of the market is assessed. The Tribunal identified 
five elements of market structure that need to be considered as part of the effects test.10 Let 
me say a few words about each of them. 
First, the number and relative size of sellers (their market shares) over time is recognised as a 
major element of market structure. A market structure consisting of one dominant firm whose 
market share has remained constant over time, with a few small suppliers would suggest the 
                                                          
6
 Final Report of the Competition Policy Review Committee, March 2015, at 348. 
7
 For a more detailed examination of this question see P Armitage, ‘The evolution of the substantial lessening of competition test – a review 
of the case law’ (2016) 44(2) Australian Business Law Review 74. 
8 Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd and Defiance Holdings (1976) 25 FLR 169 at 188. For recent commentary on the 
continued relevance of this Tribunal determination see P. Williams, “QCMA, forty years on” The 2016 Bannerman Lecture, 11 February 
2016 available at http://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Bannerman%20Competition%20Lecture%202016%20-
%20Dr%20Philip%20Williams%20%20lecture%20paper.pdf. 
9
 C Kaysen and D Turner, Antitrust Policy (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1965) 59. 
10
 Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd and Defiance Holdings (1976) 25 FLR 169 at 188-189. 
4 | P a g e  
 
presence of market power. On the other hand, a larger number of firms with no relatively 
large firms, and frequent changes in market shares would suggest the absence of market 
power. 
While a firm with market power will usually has a large market share, market share alone is 
not a reliable indicator of market power. If there are no, or low, barriers to entry, a firm with 
a large market share will not be able to raise its price above competitive levels for fear of 
attracting new entry. Such markets are said to be contestable. One important barrier to entry 
arises where there are economies of scale in production and the minimum efficient scale 
(MES), that is the optimum least cost scale of the plant and firm, is very large relative to the 
size market as a whole.  
The third element of market structure is product differentiation. Product differentiation, as the 
name suggests, refers to the ways in which firms seek to distinguish their products from those 
of their competitors in order to establish customer loyalty. This can include product variation 
and expenditure on advertising and marketing. If product differentiation is effective it will 
operate as a kind of barrier to entry, but is treated separately under the Re QCMA structural 
analysis. 
The fourth element of market structure is the character of vertical relationships with 
customers and suppliers. Vertical relationships refer to those between a seller and other firms 
in different functional markets either upstream, (with suppliers of factor inputs), or 
downstream, (with distributors and buyers). For example, where all or most of the 
distribution outlets for a particular product are tied to some existing firms by exclusive 
agreements, this will act as a kind barrier to new entry, but is treated separately under the Re 
QCMA structural analysis. 
The fifth element of market structure is the character of horizontal relationships between 
existing sellers. These may include price leadership, market sharing arrangements, and trade 
association reporting arrangements and other conduct which indicates a lack of independent-
decision making by sellers in the market. 
One final piece of guidance from Re QCMA: the Tribunal stated: “…there should be 
independent rivalry in all dimensions of the price-product-service packages offered to 
consumers and customers”.11 An effects test requires an assessment not just of the effect or 
likely effect of the conduct on the price of the product (whether it will increase), but also the 
effect on output, quality and service (whether they will decrease). 
B Outboard Marine Australia v Hecar 
The Re QCMA structural analysis for determining the effect of conduct on competition in a 
market has been adopted many times by the Federal Court. 
12
 Early judicial guidance came in 
                                                          
11
 Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd and Defiance Holdings (1976) 25 FLR 169  at 188. 
12
 See, for example, Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd v Hecar Investments No 6 Pty Ltd (1982) 66 FLR 120 at 123 (Bowen CJ and Fisher 
J); Arnotts Limited v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 336 (Lockhart, Wilcox and Gummow JJ); and Seven Network 
Limited v News Limited (2009) 182 FCR 160 at 282-3 [582] (Dowsett and Lander JJ). 
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1982 with the decision of the Full Federal Court in Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd v 
Hecar Investments (No 6) Pty Ltd. 
13
 
The Court held that the state of competitive rivalry depended on the structure of the market 
and that a substantial lessening of competition involved a change in the structure of the 
market. The test for determining the effect of conduct on competitive rivalry is to consider: 
what is the likely structure in the future with the conduct at issue is compared with what is the 
likely structure in the future without the conduct. The counterfactual analysis begins with 
market definition and then an analysis of structure, with the main focus being on barriers to 
entry rather than market concentration. The structure will determine the conduct of the firms 
and the level of competitive rivalry between them.14  
It is necessary to ask: will the conduct at issue change the structure of the market? Is it 
harming the competitive process? Will it continually deter new entry? The proper question to 
ask is: looking into the future, will the conduct reduce competitive rivalry that would 
otherwise have existed in the market but for the conduct in question?
15
 
The test is a difficult one for lawyers to apply in practice. Lawyers are accustomed to 
gathering evidence (facts) about past conduct rather than making predictions about the likely 
economic effect of future conduct. The effects test requires them to make predictions and 
judgments deduced from facts about what is likely to occur in the future as regards existing 
competitors and potential new entrants.  
C Section 50(3) of the CCA 
In 1992, the first statutory guidance as to the meaning and content of the effects test was 
provided when the standard for assessing mergers was changed from a dominance standard to 
an effects-based standard. As a part of those reforms, s 50(3) was inserted into the Act. 
Section 50(3) of the CCA sets out the structural elements a court must take into account in 
determining whether an acquisition would have, or be likely to have the effect of 
substantially lessening competition in a market. It is not an exhaustive list. The matters 
largely follow the structural ‘checklist’ of factors identified by the Tribunal in the Re QCMA 
case and adopted in subsequent cases involving mergers.
16
  
Section 50(3) provides: 
Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account for the purposes of subsections (1) 
and (2) in determining whether the acquisition would have the effect, or be likely to have the 
effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market, the following matters must be taken 
into account: 
                                                          
13 Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd v Hecar Investments (No 6) Pty Ltd (1982) 66 FLR 120. 
14 Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd v Hecar Investments (No 6) Pty Ltd (1982) 66 FLR 120 at 123-124 and the Stirling Harbour Services 
Pty Ltd v Bunbury Port Authority (2000) ATPR ¶41-783 at 41,267[12] and (Burchett and Hely JJ). 
15
 Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd v Bunbury Port Authority (2000) ATPR ¶41-783 at [12] and [86]. 
16 TPC v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1978) 32 FLR 305 at 325 (Northrop J); TPC v Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd 
(1988) ATPR ¶40-876 at 49,480 (Wilcox J); and Arnotts Limited v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 336 (Lockhart, 
Wilcox and Gummow JJ) . 
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(a) the actual and potential level of import competition in the market; 
(b) the height of barriers to entry to the market; 
(c) the level of concentration in the market; 
(d) the degree of countervailing power in the market; 
(e) the likelihood that the acquisition would result in the acquirer being able to significantly 
and substantially increase prices or profit margins; 
(f) the extent to which substitutes are available in the market or are likely to be available in 
the market; 
(g) the dynamic characteristics of the market, including growth, innovation and product 
differentiation; 
(h) the likelihood that the acquisition would result in the removal from the market of a 
vigorous and effective competitor; 
(i) the nature and extent of vertical integration in the market. 
An important point to note about this list of factors is that there is no mention of efficiency as 
a factor that the court must consider in applying the effects test. 
D AGL v ACCC (No 3) 
The next significant step in the evolution of the effects test came in 2003, with the decision of 
French J in Australian Gas Light Co Ltd v ACCC (No 3).
17
 Two important points emerge 
from this case. First, French J stressed the need to consider the longer term effect of the 
conduct at issue, rather than short-term phenomena. His Honour concluded that the existence 
of substantial lessening of competition needs to be assessed over a period of years rather than 
months, and certainly not the half-hourly price spikes which the ACCC argued demonstrated 
the exercise of market power. The Court found that the barriers to entry to the wholesale 
electricity market were not such as to ‘significantly support or contribute to market power on 
the part of any of the market participants’.18 Over the longer term (two years), French J 
found
19
 that barriers to entry into electricity generation were relatively low and that gas 
turbines are able to be commissioned in ‘under two years’..20 
The second important finding in this case relates to the meaning of ‘likely’ in the phrase 
‘likely effect of substantially lessening competition’. French J stated: 
In my opinion, having regard to the statutory context provided by the other sections of Pt IV, 
the correct construction is that “likely” refers to a significant finite probability, or “a real 
chance” rather than “more probable than not”. 21 
                                                          
17 Australian Gas Light Co Ltd v ACCC (No 3) (2003) 137 FCR 317. 
18 Australian Gas Light Co Ltd v ACCC (No 3) (2003) 137 FCR 317 at [391]. 
19
 Australian Gas Light Co v ACCC (No 3) (2003) 137 FCR 317 at 430 [391]. 
20 Australian Gas Light Co v ACCC (No 3) (2003) 137 FCR 317 at 457 [493]. 
21 Australian Gas Light Co Ltd v ACCC (No 3) (2003) 137 FCR 317 at [343]. 
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E Rural Press Ltd v ACCC 
Also in 2003, the High Court considered the meaning of the word ‘substantial’ in the effects 
test. There is a de minimis or threshold test that has to be met under the effects test. The effect 
or likely effect on competition must be ‘substantial’. In Rural Press Ltd v ACCC, 22 the High 
Court majority confirmed the findings made by the primary judge, Mansfield J, that there had 
been a contravention of s 45(2) of the CCA in that the parties had made and given effect to an 
arrangement having the purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition. The majority 
stated that the word ‘substantial’ was used ‘in the sense of being meaningful or relevant to the 
competitive process’.23  
What does ‘meaningful or relevant’ mean in practice? How are we to measure the anti-
competitive impact of the impugned conduct? It is necessary to consider its impact on all 
aspects of the price – product –service package. Will it result in an increase in prices? Will it 
result in a restriction in output? Will it result in a decline in quality or service levels?  
F ACCC v MetcashTrading  
The standard of proof to be applied under the effects test was at issue in the 2011 decision of 
the Full Federal Court in ACCC v Metcash Trading Limited. As you know, the inquiry under 
the effects test involves two steps. The first step is identifying the most likely counterfactual, 
that is, what would happen in the future without the impugned conduct. The second step is 
determining whether the likely effect of the impugned conduct is to substantially lessen 
competition.  
The primary judge, Emmett J, in ACCC v Metcash Trading Limited,
24
 stated that in relation 
to the second step: 
The better view is that likely signifies a real chance rather than a greater probability than not .
25
 
However, Emmett J held that the ‘real chance’ test does not apply in relation to the first step, 
identifying the most likely counterfactual. His Honour held that the test to be applied in 
relation to the first step is the civil standard on the balance of probabilities. 
Emmett J held: 
 
…the Commission must satisfy the Court that its counterfactual is more probable than any 
competing hypothesis advanced to suggest that there is no real chance of competition being 
substantially lessened as a result of the acquisition.
26
 
On appeal, ACCC v Metcash Trading Limited,
27
 Buchanan J agreed with Emmett J that the 
                                                          
22 Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 216 CLR 53. 
23
 Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 216 CLR 53 at 71 [41] (Gummow, Hayne  and Heydon JJ). 
24
 ACCC v Metcash Trading Limited (2011) 282 ALR 464.  
25 ACCC v Metcash Trading Limited  (2011) 282 ALR 464 at [134]-[135].  
26
 ACCC v Metcash Trading Limited (2011) 282 ALR 464  at [145]-[146]. 
27
 ACCC v Metcash Trading Limited (2011) 198 FCR 297. 
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balance of probabilities test should be applied to the first step of the inquiry. His Honour 
stated: 
If the ACCC was correct about its two stage applications of the “real chance” test, the case would have 
to be decided upon a position where speculation was heaped upon speculation ... Further, in my view, 
application of the “real chance” test even at the second stage also presents problems. The 
circumstances of the present case, with its concentration on comparisons which are all in the future, 
provide an illustration of the danger of descending into the realm of conjecture.
28
 
Finn and Yates JJ declined to express a concluded view on the proper standard of proof to be 
applied in relation to identifying the counterfactual.  
In summary, the counterfactual will in some cases be the status quo or current state of 
competitive rivalry without the conduct at issue; however, if the status quo is about to 
change, the counterfactual should reflect that change. The applicant bears the onus of proof as 
to what is the appropriate counterfactual, but it is unclear whether the applicant must satisfy 
the court that its proposed counterfactual is the most likely one ‘on the balance of 
probabilities’, or merely that there is a ‘real chance’ of it occurring. According to Emmett and 
Buchanan JJ, the balance of probabilities standard is to be applied in assessing the first step, 
identifying the counterfactual. However, in relation to the second step, (determining whether 
the conduct is ‘likely’ to substantially lessen competition), the weight of authority is to apply 
the ‘real chance’ test, rather than the balance of probabilities standard. 
 
IV What role does economic efficiency play in applying the effects test?  
How is efficiency to be integrated into the effects test? If ‘competition’ in Pt IV of the CCA 
means ‘rivalry’ there is little scope for efficiency considerations. However, in some cases it is 
not possible to partition ‘competition’ and ‘efficiencies’ as two separate concepts, because 
the long-term competitive structure of markets can be determined by efficiencies.  
Under the existing effects test in s 50 of the CCA the courts have sent mixed messages about 
the role played by efficiency. A firm’s ability to achieve economies of scale or scope 
enhances its ability to compete more vigorously. These efficiencies will have a bearing on the 
future state of competition as a process of rivalry, and must be taken into account in any 
assessment of the competitive effects of conduct. 29  This was recognised by Emmett J in 
ACCC v Metcash Trading Ltd, who stated: 
 
If the proposed acquisition has the potential to create significant economies of scale or scope for the 
merged firm, it may be desirable to assess whether the potential reduction in competition from the 
reduced number of participants in the relevant market might be offset by the fact that the merged entity 
will be a more efficient and aggressive competitor.
30
 
                                                          
28
 ACCC v Metcash Trading Limited (2011) 198 FCR 297 at [6]. 
29 M Brunt, Economic Essays on Australian and New Zealand Competition Law (Kluwer, Law Int'l, 2003), pp 332-336.  
30 ACCC v Metcash Trading Ltd [2011] FCA 967 at [168] (Emmett J).See P Williams and G Woodbridge, “The Relation of Efficiencies to 
the Substantial Lessening of Competition Test for Mergers: Substitutes or Complements?” (2002) 30 Australian Business Law Review 435 
at  442. 
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However, others have expressed the view that efficiency plays no part at all under the effects 
test. In Davids Holdings Pty Ltd v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth,
31
 Drummond J 
stated: 
Provisions such as s 50 are not tools designed to enable the Court to strike a balance between the 
economic advantages that might flow from the economies of scale and other efficiencies resulting from 
a particular merger, on the one hand, and the economic detriments of the merger, such as increased 
prices that consumers may have to pay, on the other.
32
 
In any event, doubts about the role of efficiency in any effects test under the proposed s 46(1) 
will be removed by the direction in the proposed s46(2). 
A Efficiency and purpose 
Let me make a few observations about text of the proposed amendment. The wording of the 
proposed amendment states that efficiency has a role to play in relation to the ‘purpose’ limb 
of the slc test in s 46(1). In relation to the ‘purpose’ limb, it may be possible to argue that the 
purpose of a provision in a contract, or the purpose of those responsible for giving effect to 
the impugned conduct, was to achieve efficiencies.
33
  
The issue arose in relation to s 27 of the Commerce Act 1986 (NZ) in Clear Communications 
Ltd v Sky Network Television Ltd .139 Section 27 of the Commerce Act 1986 (NZ) prohibits 
provisions in contracts, arrangements or understandings that have the purpose, effect or likely 
effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. In that case the dominant 
telecommunications carrier in New Zealand (Telecom) wished to enter the pay TV market. 
Telecom acquired an interest in Sky Network Television and entered into a proposed 
programme agreement with it. Clear Communications was Telecom's main rival in 
telecommunications, but Clear Communications was not in the pay TV market. 
It was claimed that s 27 of the Commerce Act 1986 (NZ) would be breached if Telecom were 
to enter the pay TV market. Counsel for Clear Communications invited the New Zealand 
High Court to ‘disregard any positive contribution that efficiencies make to the competitive 
process’.34The Court rejected the submission. In applying the two limbs of s 27 ‘purpose’ and 
‘effect’ of a provision the Court noted: 
Section 27 is couched in terms of both “purpose” and “effect”. Where the effect of Telecom's 
expansion into Pay TV may well be the achievement of economies of scale and scope, that in 
itself can simply be viewed as an element in a long run dynamic competitive process. Clear's 
propositions were largely in terms of “effect”, but also as to “purpose”, if Telecom's purpose 
is to expand its business into complementary products, achieving in the process economies of 
scale and scope, it cannot be said to be pursuing an anti-competitive purpose….35 
 
                                                          
31
 Davids Holdings Pty Ltd v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth(1994) 49 FCR 211 
32
 Davids Holdings Pty Ltd v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth(1994) 49 FCR 211 at 248. 
33
 Brunt, Economic Essays on Australian and New Zealand Competition Law (Kluwer Law Int'l, 2003) pp 335-336. 
139Clear Communications Ltd v Sky Network Television Ltd (High Court of New Zealand, Wellington Registry CP 19/96, 1 August 1997, 
Gallen J and Dr M Brunt). 
34 Clear Communications Ltd v Sky Network Television Ltd (High Court of New Zealand, Wellington Registry CP 19/96, 1 August 1997, 
Gallen J and Dr M Brunt). 
35 Clear Communications Ltd v Sky Network Television Ltd (High Court of New Zealand, Wellington Registry CP 19/96, 1 August 1997, 
Gallen J and Dr M Brunt) at 68. 
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B Efficiency and effect on competition 
My second observation about the wording of the proposed s 46(2) is that efficiency also has a 
role to play in relation to the ‘effect’ limb of the effects test in s 46(1), but it is only relevant 
to the extent that it increases competitive rivalry. 
Production efficiencies that result in lower costs arising from economies of scale and 
economies of scope may allow firms with substantial market power to compete more 
vigorously on price. Such efficiencies may allow them to undercut smaller competitors. Such 
conduct has neither the purpose, nor the effect of substantially lessening competition; rather, 
it is a function of the long-run dynamic competitive process. It will not contravene s 46(1) 
under an effects test.  
Dynamic efficiencies in the form of innovation will also be relevant to a firm’s ability to 
compete more effectively. If a firm invests in research and development leading to new 
processes, products or marketing techniques that reduce costs, this will allow the firm to 
compete more effectively. It will not contravene s 46(1) under an effects test even though it 
harms individual competitors. It is a function of the long-run dynamic competitive process.  
Relevant questions here are:  
 Does the conduct facilitate investment in services, quality and innovation? 
 Does it facilitate entry and expansion? 
 Does it reduce free-riding which may affect the dynamics of investment and 
competition? 
 Does it reduce the risk of hold-up or other forms of opportunistic behaviour 
associated with long-term investments? 
 Does it reduce transaction costs by avoiding the need for constant negotiation of 
contracts? 
 Does it reduce search costs for consumers by providing access to information that 
would not otherwise be available? 
 Does it reduce switching costs? 
These questions will be especially relevant in electronic market places that make use of the 
internet. As Roth J observed in in Streetmap EU Limited v Google Inc: 
…the internet has had a profound effect in changing the way in which many traditional goods and 
services are offered to the public and in enabling the introduction of new kinds of products altogether. 
It has developed rapidly since about the mid-1990s, both as regards technical innovation and in the 
spread of internet usage. This development presents a challenge for competition law.
36
 
Where conduct makes customers better informed, it enhances their ability to switch to 
suppliers offering more favourable price-product-service packages. This increased mobility 
of customers enhances competitive rivalry between suppliers. 
 
                                                          
36
 Streetmap EU Limited v Google Inc [2016] EWHC 253 (Ch)  at [2]-[3]. 
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C Offsetting a reduction in competition by efficiency gains 
The direction in s 46(2) to have regard to economic efficiency when assessing the effect or 
likely effect of conduct on competition will require a balancing exercise in some cases. For 
example, where a firm with substantial market power appoints exclusive distributors for each 
State or Territory, this may reduce competition for its brand since there will be only one 
source of supply for the brand. The Tribunal In re Tooth & Co Ltd; In re Tooheys Ltd, 
37
 
noted that exclusive dealing provisions in contracts that cover a large proportion of 
distributors and last a long period of time, may have the effect of foreclosing the possibility 
of entry to the market. 
It may, however, increase competition by providing an incentive for the distributor appointed 
to make investments in specialist equipment, showrooms and training staff that create 
distribution efficiencies. This will increase inter-brand competition. In analysing the effect of 
the exclusivity provision on competition it is necessary to have counterfactual market 
structure in mind. Without the exclusivity provision the distributor might not make the 
investment for fear of other distributors in the territory taking a free ride on its investment. 
The High Court in Melway Publishing  Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd,
38
 stated that the 
‘overall effect on competition of such restraints is not necessarily negative and may be 
positive’. 
To take another example, a take-or-pay provision in a long-term contract for the use of a gas 
pipeline may reduce competition because the user will be unlikely to use the services of 
another supplier for the duration of the contract. This will foreclose other suppliers of 
pipeline services from the market. However, in analysing the effect of the take-or-pay 
provision on competition it is necessary to have a counterfactual market structure in mind. 
Without the take-or-pay provision, the investment in the gas pipeline may not have occurred 
because of the risk of hold-up or other forms of opportunistic behaviour by users of the gas 
pipeline. The Tribunal has recognised that by facilitating investment take-or-pay provisions 
can in some cases be seen, on balance, as pro-competitive rather than an instrument of 
foreclosure.
39
  
Any claim of efficiency enhancing competition in s 46 will put some of the burden of proof 
on the respondent.
40
 The respondent will be obliged to come forward and explain what it was 
seeking to achieve by pursuing the conduct at issue – how the conduct at issue would increase 
competitive rivalry. It is likely that seeking to prove or disprove the effect of any claimed 
efficiency on the competitive process will result in a considerable growth in the complexity 
of the evidence which the Court will need to control. 
Section 46 cases tend to be long and complex and will generally be subject to a case 
management regime. Expert economic evidence is commonplace in cases brought under Pt 
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38
 Melway Publishing  Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1 at [20] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
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IV of the CCA. The Federal Court Rules 2011 empower the Court to order that there are no 
more than a specified number of expert witnesses; requiring experts who are to give reports 
to meet for the purpose of identifying and addressing the issues in dispute between them; and 
requiring the attendance by parties at a case management conference to consider the most 
economic and efficient means of bringing the proceeding to trial and of conducting the trial.
41
 
IVStreetmap.EU Limited v Google Inc 
 
A counterfactual assessment as part of an effects test under the proposed s 46 is similar to the 
way abusive exclusionary conduct is examined under the misuse of market power provisions 
of the EU and the UK. The relevant equivalent provisions are Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)  and s 18(1) prohibition under the Competition 
Act 1998 (UK). 
 
In 2009, the European Commission issued Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty (now Article 102 of the TFEU) to abusive exclusionary conduct 
by dominant undertakings.
42
 At para [20] the Commission sets out a list of structural factors 
that it will take into account in assessing whether conduct is likely to lead to anti-competitive 
foreclosure. Paragraphs 21 and 22 then explain the circumstances in which it will apply the 
counterfactual: 
 
21. When pursuing a case the Commission will develop the analysis of the general factors mentioned in 
paragraph 20, together with the more specific factors described in the sections dealing with certain 
types of exclusionary conduct, and any other factors which it may consider to be appropriate. This 
assessment will usually be made by comparing the actual or likely future situation in the relevant 
market (with the dominant undertaking's conduct in place) with an appropriate counterfactual, such as 
the simple absence of the conduct in question or with another realistic alternative scenario, having 
regard to established business practices. 
 
22. There may be circumstances where it is not necessary for the Commission to carry out a detailed 
assessment before concluding that the conduct in question is likely to result in consumer harm. If it 
appears that the conduct can only raise obstacles to competition and that it creates no efficiencies, its 
anti-competitive effect may be inferred. This could be the case, for instance, if the dominant 
undertaking prevents its customers from testing the products of competitors or provides financial 
incentives to its customers on condition that they do not test such products, or pays a distributor or a 
customer to delay the introduction of a competitor's product. 
The England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) recently applied the counterfactual 
approach in Streetmap EU Limited v Google Inc.
43
 The essential facts of this case were that 
Streetmap carried on business in the market for online mapping services. Google carried on 
business in the market for online general search engines. In 2005 Google launched an online 
mapping product called ‘Google Maps’. 
The visual display of Google’s search results is referred to as the ‘Search Engine Results 
Page’ or ‘SERP’. The SERP includes links to relevant websites or webpages. The user can 
                                                          
41
 Rule 5.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. 
42
 Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings 
OJ 2009 C 45/7. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01)&from=EN. 
43
 Streetmap EU Limited v Google Inc [2016] EWHC 253 (Ch) (Roth J). 
13 | P a g e  
 
click on the link to get direct access to the site or page. Under the old Maps OneBox Google 
listed other British online mapping providers including Streetmap. Under the new Maps 
OneBox Google displayed a clickable thumbnail map from Google Maps, and no other online 
maps. The essence of Streemap’s claim of a contravention of Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and s 18(1) prohibition under the Competition 
Act 1998 (UK) was that this was a form of discrimination. It was alleged that Goggle was 
using its dominant position in the general search engine market to foreclose competitors of 
Google Maps in the market for on-line maps. Streetmap’s claim was not that Google should 
not have displayed a clickable thumb map on its SERP, since this was clearly a benefit to 
consumers. Rather, it argued that Google should have provided a link to Streetmap and other 
mapping providers as well as Google Maps in the search results to enable them to get access 
to customers.
44
 
Roth J stated: 
I have concluded that introduction of the new-style Maps OneBox was intended to improve Google's 
offering in the market for general search …The unusual and challenging feature of this case is that 
conduct which was pro-competitive in the market in which the undertaking is dominant is alleged to be 
abusive on the grounds of an alleged anti-competitive effect in a distinct market in which it is not 
dominant.
45
  
 
Streetmap alleged that Google’s purpose in introducing the new Maps OneBox was to 
foreclose competition from Google Maps’ competitors in the online mapping market. Roth J 
concluded that Google’s main purpose in introducing the new Maps OneBox was to improve 
its general search engine by remedying its perceived deficiencies when compared with its 
competitors in the general search market.
46
 
In considering the effect or likely effect of the new Maps OneBox on competition Roth J 
applied the counterfactual approach:  
 
In addressing the effect of particular conduct, it is necessary to have in mind the alternative position 
against which that effect falls to be assessed: i.e. what is usually referred to as the counterfactual. Both 
sides' economic experts approached this on the basis that the relevant counterfactual is the situation 
which prevailed before the new-style Maps OneBox was introduced. That was the old-style Maps 
OneBox, which did not contain any thumbnail map… There was no suggestion by Streetmap that this 
old-style Maps OneBox gave rise to an abuse.
47
  
Roth J concluded on a consideration of all the evidence that the introduction the new Maps 
OneBox did not have an appreciable effect in taking custom away from Streetmap, and that it 
was unlikely to give rise to anti-competitive foreclosure.
48
 The market for online maps in the 
UK was growing significantly and steadily over the period 2000-2010. His Honour observed: 
The main providers competing with Google Maps in 2007 were Streetmap and MultiMap. But the fact 
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that Google Maps gained market share compared to Streetmap and MultiMap does not in itself 
indicate, let alone establish, that the new-style Maps OneBox was the cause, or even a contributory 
cause. Any relative success of Google Maps is equally explicable on the basis of features of Google 
Maps that attracted users: i.e., competition on the merits.
49
 
Google Maps had adopted many new product developments such as ‘natural language’ 
searching which allowed a user to type in a request for a destination such as the British 
Museum, without a street address. There was significant evidence that ‘Streetmap was 
deficient or lagging behind as regards many of these functional developments’.50  
Roth J noted: 
It is axiomatic, as I remarked earlier, that competition by a dominant company is to be encouraged. 
Where – as here – its conduct is pro-competitive on the market where it is dominant, it would to my 
mind be perverse to find that it contravenes competition law because it may have a non-appreciable 
effect on a related market where competition is not otherwise weakened. 
51
  
This case demonstrates that harm to individual competitors is not to be equated with harm to 
competition as a process, and that a firm with substantial market power should not be 
precluded from competing vigorously on the merits through product innovation by 
competition law. 
V Authorisation for s 46 conduct 
Finally, I would like to consider very briefly the circumstances in which authorisation might 
be available for s 46 conduct? The test for authorisation in relation to other Part IV conduct 
subject to an effects test is limited to a consideration of the detriment arising from a lessening 
of competition. For example s 90(6) of the CCA provides that the ACCC must not grant 
authorisation for proposed provisions and provisions in existing agreements that might 
substantially lessen competition unless the ACCC is satisfied that the ‘benefit [to the public] 
would outweigh the detriment to the public constituted by any lessening of competition that 
would result, or be likely to result if the proposed conduct were engaged in’. This is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘net benefit test’. Given that the applicant for authorisation of s 
46 conduct already has substantial market power, the ACCC is likely to scrutinise the 
conduct at issue carefully before being convinced that it gives rise to a net public benefit. 
Cross subsidisation is an example of s 46 conduct that may be eligible for authorisation after 
the changes take effect. Cross subsidisation may be a form of predatory pricing. Where a firm 
allocates disproportionately high costs to one product or geographic market where it faces 
little or no competition in order to charge very low prices for another product or geographic 
market where it faces strong competition, this may harm competition in the latter market. 
However, where cross subsidisation is practised by a corporation with substantial market 
power to enable it to subsidise services to remote communities, reasoning of that kind might 
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be relevant as a public benefit in an application for authorisation.52 
VI Conclusion 
Against this background are the two claims made by the government for s 46 with an effects 
test, namely that it will be easier to satisfy than the existing s 46 and that it will provide a 
greater level of protection for small businesses, likely to be satisfied. 
 
It is not possible to give an easy answer to the first claim. Much will depend on the conduct at 
issue and the markets affected. The removal of the taking advantage element should make it 
easier for the ACCC or a private party to challenge unilateral anti-competitive conduct. In 
addition, the removal of the need to prove a subjective anti-competitive purpose may ease the 
applicant’s evidentiary burden. The need to prove that the impugned conduct will have an 
adverse effect on the structure of the market requires the applicant to prove the most likely 
counterfactual on the balance of probabilities (the intermediate issue). This may be easier in 
relation to past conduct, where the most likely counterfactual could well be the situation that 
prevailed before the impugned conduct took effect. However, it is likely to be more 
problematic if the impugned conduct is being challenged prospectively. As regards the 
ultimate issue, it may be easier to prove a substantial lessening of competition where the 
conduct has its effect in the market where the respondent has substantial market power. If the 
respondent incumbent is a monopolist seeking to deter new entry the threshold could be quite 
low as demonstrated by the Rural Press case. This is because the very presence of a powerful 
single firm in that market will mean that competitive constraints are weak. Any new injection 
of competition is likely to enhance competitive rivalry, and any attempt to stop it likely to be 
a substantial lessening of competition. However, where the impugned conduct has its anti-
competitive effect in a market other than the one in which the respondent has substantial 
market power, it may be more difficult to prove a substantial lessening of competition. 
Finally, the need to off-set any lessening of competition with the pro-competitive effects of 
enhanced efficiencies adds a layer of complexity to the new s 46 effects test. While the 
burden of demonstrating that the impugned conduct was necessary to facilitate investment 
which increases competition will rest on the respondent, the applicant will bear the burden of 
having to refute the claim.  
 
Similarly, it is not possible to give an easy answer to the second claim that s 46 will provide 
additional protection for small businesses. A common fallacy is to equate harm to individual 
competitors with harm to competition. The object of the new s 46(1) is to protect competition 
as a process of rivalry, not to protect a class of competitors such as small businesses. 
Protecting competition will generate efficiency for the benefit of consumers; it will not 
generate fairness for small business competitors. Where corporations, such as the large 
supermarket chains, are undercutting small retailers by relying on lower costs associated with 
economies of scale and scope, such conduct has neither the purpose, nor the effect of 
substantially lessening competition. Rather, it is a function of the long-run dynamic 
competitive process. Supermarkets will only be at risk under the new s 46(1) if they engage 
                                                          
52
NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 219 CLR 90 at 140 [137]. 
16 | P a g e  
 
in conduct that erects artificial barriers leading to long-run actual or potential foreclosure, for 
example, by entering into exclusivity arrangements with the owners of shopping centres that 
deny other retailers access to them. As Roth J indicated in the Streetmap case, it is axiomatic 
that firms with substantial market power should be able to compete on the merits. If they 
innovate and introduce new functional developments, their smaller competitors may be 
harmed but an effects test under s 46 will not be of assistance to them in forcing their larger 
rival to lend them a helping hand. The direction to the Court in the proposed s 46(2) to take 
efficiency into account in so far as it increases competitive rivalry may mean that small 
businesses will not obtain an increased level of protection they are hoping for from the 
proposed s 46(1). 
 
